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COMIIENTS
A SOLUTION TO THE DEBT-EQUITY PROBLEM1
Over the past few decades, one of the most vexing tax problems has been the
treatment afforded periodic payments made by corporations upon shareholder
advances. Whether they are considered interest or dividends is of great im-
portance not only to the corporation but also to the shareholder.
There is a distinct advantage to the corporation which is able to treat these
advances as debt rather than equity funds. The present law allows a corporation
to treat interest payments on debt as a business expense, and enables it to
deduct such expenses in computing taxable income.' If these were considered
dividends on stock ownership, no such deduction would be allowable under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The most important effect upon the individual shareholder occurs in connec-
tion with repayment of principal. Such is the case, for the return of principal,
is tax free to the shareholder up to the amount of the loan, while stock re-
demption could result in ordinary income and would then be taxable.2 Likewise,
whether the advances are designated debt or equity could be of significance were
the corporation to become insolvent. If the firm is unable to meet payments of
interest or principal on the loan, the shareholder would find it beneficial to be
able to treat the advance as a loan rather than as a contribution to equity.
Under the Code, he could obtain a more favorable tax treatment if he were
allowed to treat such losses as bad business debt rather than capital loss.P
The effect on the shareholder's personal tax is minimal, however, whether
periodic payments by the corporation are labeled interest or dividends.4
The significant problem faced by the Commissioner and the courts has been
the formulation of the tests to be used in judging the status of stockholder
advances. Over the past three decades, the tax court and various federal
courts have attempted in vain to lay down definite criteria for the evaluation
of these advances.5 On the whole, they have sought some type of objective
standard that could be applied to any case involving stockholder "loans." In
their search, the courts have, in varying degrees, placed emphasis on the
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 163(a). "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest
paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
2. Int. Re,. Code of 1954, §§ 1232(a)(I)-(2), 302, 316(a),(b).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 166(d). Note that even if the advance is declared a loan,
the stockholder, in order to take the bad debt deduction, must show that the loan was a
business rather than a non-business debt.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 34 abolishes, as of 1965, the favorable treatment afforded
dividends under the old 4% "dividends received" credit. From 1964 to 1965, the credit is
reduced to 2%. At the same time Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 116 vill increase the "dividends
received" exclusion from the prezent $50, to $100. Income received from interest is taxed
as ordinary income.
5. See Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed.
Tax 771, S06-13 (1959) for a criticism of the Tax Court's handling of the debt-equity
problem.
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real "intention of the parties"6 and have varied greatly on what they con-
sidered as being important indicia of this intent.7
I. THE PRE-Kelley ERA
Prior to 1946, the courts were primarily interested in whether the parties
intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship or a corporation-stockholder
relation. The general approach was that of examining the "four corners" of
the instrument, 8 as the courts confined their search for intent to the face of
the security. Consequently, they met with little success in forming any compre-
hensive rule for judging the nature of a particular advanceY
Corporations had differing needs, and tailored their financial instruments
to meet them. During the early part of the century, corporations began
combining the attractive features of debt instruments with those of stock, in
order to attract investment funds. These "hybrid securities" were and still
are one of the main reasons for confusion in the area of shareholder advances.
Because they contain features common to both debt and equity instruments,
courts found themselves hard-pressed trying to label them as one or the
other. As a result, rather than attempt to set any fixed norms, the courts were
more concerned with the total picture presented.' 0
Although the factors which the courts thought were significant in the
determination of the nature of any particular instrument may be isolated for
discussion, it should be pointed out that, in general, no factor alone would be
decisive in this regard. Further, consideration of these factors under the
pre-1946 section does not mean that they are not used today. Presently, they
are used in conjunction with more "modern" tests."
6. Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. J. N. Bray Co., 126 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1942), affirming 9 P-H Tax Ct.
Mem. 837 (1940); Commissioner v. Proctor Shop, Inc., 82 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1936), affirm-
ing 30 B.T.A. 721 (1934); Verifine Dairy Prods. Corp., 3 T.C. 269, 276 (1944).
7. Professor Caplin believes that "the history of 'thin incorporation' may be divided into
three major periods: Pre-1946: struggle with hybrid securities; 1946-1956: reliance upon
ratios; 1956 to date [1959]: decline of ratio test and search for 'substance.'" Caplin, supra
note 5, at 774. An almost identical classification is used by Weis, The Labyrinth of the Thin
Corporation, 40 Taxes 568, 569-71 (1962). This type of approach has been criticized as
being an "oversimplification in so far as it suggests that courts no longer are confronted
with 'hybrids' or no longer think ratios important." Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to
Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and Related Problems, 16 Tax. L. Rev. 1, 18 n.92 (1960).
8. Caplin, supra note 5, at 776; Weis, supra note 7, at 569-70.
9. See De Stefano, Stock or Debt-That Is the Question, 18 Fordham L. Rev. 251, 253
(1949); Weis, supra note 7, at 589.
10. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Wetterau Grocer Co. v.
Commissioner, 179 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1950); Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v. Commissioner,
172 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1949); Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1935).
11. E.g., Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing 35
T.C. 268 (1960) (substantial economic reality test); Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957), affirming 23 T.C.
408 (1954) (business purpose test); Mullin Bldg. Corp., 9 T.C. 350 (1947) (debt-equity
test).
A. Designation
Probably one of the least important factors considered by the courts is
the name given to the instrument. However, even this will not always be
treated lightly.12 Generally, the courts take the view that substance predomi-
nates over form,13 and designation by the parties that an advance was a loan,
or a payment is interest, does not necessarily make them such. 4 Such con-
fusing names as "debenture preferred stock,' '15 "participating dividend deben-
ture certificates"'16 and "liquidation rights certificates"' 7 illustrate the many
hybrid variations which corporations have devised.
B. Maturity Date
One of the most oft-cited factors for determining the nature of the in-
strument is the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date, i.e., does the in-
strument contain a particular date on which the holder might demand the
unconditional return of his principal. This factor is significant as it is gen-
erally considered one of the elements essential to any debtor-creditor relation-
ship.' 3 One case defines a debt as "an unqualified obligation to pay a sum
certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage
in interest payable regardless of the debtor's income or lack thereof."' 0 When
an instrument lacks such a date, it becomes similar to stock, i.e., with stock the
shareholder is contributing to the equity of the business and, theoretically,
is not anticipating a return of invested capital on any particular dateY0 Al-
12. Commissioner v. Proctor Shop, Inc., 82 F.2d 792, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1936); Commis-
sioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1935); Richmond, F. & P.R.R,
33 B.T.A. 895, S93 (1936), aft'd, 90 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1937).
13. E.g., Bemis Hardwood Lumber Co. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 851 (W.D.N.C.
1954); Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. 403 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956);
1432 Broadway Corp., 4 T.C. 1158 (1945).
14. Kingsmill Corp., 28 T.C. 330, 336 (1957); 1432 Broadway Corp., supra note 13, at
1166; Charles L. Huisking & Co., 4 T.C. 595, 599 (1945); United State3 Playing Card Co.,
15 B.T.A. 975, 9S1 (1929).
15. Commisssioner v. J. N. Bray Co., 126 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1942), afllriing 9 P-H
Tax Ct. Mlem. 837 (1940); Brown-Rogers-DMxson Co. v. Commis-ioner, 122 F.2d 347
(4th Cir. 1941), affirming 9 P-H Tax CL Mem. 793 (1940).
16. Washmont Corp. v. Hendrickson, 137 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1943), affirming 51 F. Supp.
792 (WD. Wash. 1942).
17. Staked Plains Trust, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1944), affirming
12 P-H Tax Ct. Mfem. 1188 (1943). See generally, 2 P-H 1964 Fed. Tax Serv. 13096, at
13059-60, containing a list of over thirty different names used by corporations in labeling their
debt instruments.
18. See Bowersock Aills & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 04, 907 (10th Cir.
1949); Brown-Rogers-Dixson Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1941); Elko
Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1931); Swoby Corp, 9 T.C.
S87, 894 (1947).
19. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 24S F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 15 CCH Tax
CL Mem. 688 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
20. For a discussion of the distinctions between debt and equity instruments, se
Guthmann & Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy 163-64 (4th ed. 1962).
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though the failure to have a maturity date will often be fatal, its presence
does not, however, assure the taxpayer that the instrument will be considered
as evidencing a debt. This is because the inference of debt suggested by the
presence of a maturity date may be outweighed by the lack of another es-
sential feature.21 Furthermore, it is also quite common for preferred stock
to have a fixed maturity date.22
C. Certainty of Payment of Principal
Another important factor considered by the courts has been the nature
of the obligation to repay the principal.23 That is, is the corporation uncon-
ditionally bound to repay the money advanced by the shareholder? 24 The
absence of such a provision indicates that a true debtor-creditor relationship
was not intended by the parties. There have been cases that have considered
an unconditional and legally enforceable promise to pay an essential feature
of this relationship 25 Others have treated its presence as decisive.20 Certain
courts have held that promises to pay only out of surplus, 21 or from future
earnings, 28 or only if the capital structure of the corporation will not be
adversely affected by such payments,20 place a contingency on the payment
and thus indicate the lack of a debt obligation. Obviously, any payment
based on the future performance of the company, inherently carries with
it the uncertainty of payment. Such obligations indicate that the funds were
21. Commissioner v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1942);
Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 663 (1942); Verifine Dairy Prods. Corp., 3 T.C. 269 (1944); John Wanamaker
Philadelphia, 1 T.C. 937 (1943) ; Northern Refrigerator Line, Inc., 1 T.C. 824 (1943).
22. Messenger Publishing Co., 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 168
F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1948); Charles L. Huisking & Co., 4 T.C. 595 (1945).
23. Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1949);
Commissioner v. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 141 F.2d 467 (1st Cir. 1944), affirming 11 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 1588 (1942); Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 595, 597
(9th Cir. 1931), affirming 21 B.T.A. 291 (1930); Bruce v. Knox, 180 F. Supp. 907, 912
(D. Minn. 1960).
24. Jewel Tea Co. v. United States, 90 F.2d 451, 452 (2d Cir. 1937), affirming 15 F.
Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.
1935); Paul Autenreith, 41 B.T.A. 319 (1940).
25. Commissioner v. Page Oil Co., 129 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1942), affirming 41 B.T.A. 952
(1940); Commissioner v. J. N. Bray Co., 126 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1942), affirming 9 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 837 (1940).
26. See Brake & Elect. Sales Corp. v. United States, 287 F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1961),
affirming 185 F. Supp. 1 (D. Mass. 1960); Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 172 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1949); Associated Investors, Inc. v. United States, 52 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 1210 (D. Kan. 1956).
27. Jewel Tea Co. v. United States, 90 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1937), affirming 15 F. Supp. 56
(S.D.N.Y. 1936).
28. Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963), affirming 31 P-I-I
Tax Ct. Mem. 45 (1962).
29. Northern Refrigerator Line, Inc., 1 T.C. 824 (1943).
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COMMENTS
placed at the risk of business and are therefore to be viewed as being
analogous to stock investments.
Though the absence of a definite promise of repayment is generally regarded
as being fatal to the taxpayer's case, the converse, however, is not always
considered to conclusively indicate the presence of debt. 0 The fact that an
instrument contains a right to enforce payment upon default, is not given
great weight. This is true since in most situations the shareholders never
have the opportunity to exercise such a provision, as most cases deal with
"going concerns" and the issue of default is not involved.P' Furthermore,
when the "debt" instruments are held by persons who also own substantial
blocks of stock in the corporation, the courts are skeptical about presuming
that such persons would bring suit upon default, the rationale being that,
in effect, they would be jeopardizing their own positions as stockholders of
the firm.32 Such suits, if successful, could force the corporation into bank-
ruptcy, whereas nonenforcement of the claim would allow the firm to con-
tinue operations, with the possibility of the debt holder recouping his loss
as well as protecting his equity investment.
In cases where there has in fact been a default, failure by the stockholder
to enforce payment is some evidence that a true debtor-creditor relationship
was not contemplated. 33 Great care should be taken in weighing the signifi-
cance of this last mentioned consideration. A true debtor-creditor relationship
could be intended, but due to the particular facts, a stockholder could, once
again, consider it economically imprudent to enforce the defaulted obligation
at that particular time. As a demand of payment could result in failure of
the corporation, he might allow the firm to continue operations in the hope
of recouping his loss as well as protecting his position as a shareholder.
The Tax Court, instead of weighing heavily the fact that there was no
actial demand upon a default, should seek evidence on the question of
whether the stockholder intended ever to enforce payment. Viewed in the light
of sound financial theory, either the renewing of due notes, or the for-
bearance in their enforcement, should not be conclusive evidence that the
holder does not intend to enforce the obligation in the futureP3
D. Certainty of Payment of Interest
This factor is in many ways similar to payment of principal. This problem,
however, is twofold. First, is the corporation bound to make interest payments
30. Universal Castings Corp. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1962), affirming
37 T.C. 107 (1961); Pacific Southwest Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 815 (9th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 663 (1942), affirming 45 B.T.A. 426 (1941); Schneider Lumber
Co., 25 P-H Tax CL Alem. 104 (1956).
31. Universal Castings Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 30; Pacific Southwest Realty
Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 30.
32. Schneider Lumber Co., 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mlem. 104 (1956); Gooding Amusement Co.,
23 T.C. 40S (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 US. 1031 (1957).
33. Wilshire & Western Sandwiches, Inc. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 71S (9th Cir. 1949);
Harldns Bowling, Inc. v. Knox, 164 F. Supp. Sal (D. Alinn. 1958).
34. For a criticism of this test as applied by the court in the Gooding cae, ste Rabin,
The "Clifford Case" of the Thin Corporation, 34 Taxes 2S2, 2S4 (1956).
1964]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
periodically, and second, is a fixed rate of interest stipulated in the in-
strument? Lack of an unconditional promise to make periodic interest pay-
ments, although not generally fatal as is the lack of repayment of principal,
is indicative of a stockholder relationship. 35
Stock ownership traditionally involves the placing of funds at the risk of
business 36 in anticipation of a percentage of the profits, as well as possible
capital gains on the original investment. There is no assurance that dividends
will be paid since these are contingent upon the relative success or failure
of the business. On the other hand, a creditorship allows another the use
of funds for a price. Looking at it another way, a debtor is paying a rental
fee for the use of a particular asset; in this case, money. Thus, it is clear
that as the payment of a rental fee becomes more and more uncertain, the
less the chance that the advanced funds are intended as a loan, i.e., they appear
to be a permanent addition to the capital structure of the corporation in antic-
ipation of long-run profits. 37
On the question of fixed rate of interest, some courts have said that the
lack of such a fixed rate is indicative of an equity rather than a debt relation-
ship.38 Conversely, the presence of such a rate can be helpful to the taxpayer's
cause." However, this can be nullified where payment is made contingent upon
the adequacy of earnings, as this indicates investment rather than loan.
40
E. Subordination
The fact that shareholders have allowed their claims to be subordinated
to those of the general creditors of the corporation is afforded different weight
by the courts. Subordination simply deals with the ranking of claims in the
event of the corporation's insolvency. Obviously, if insolvency occurs, a person
35. Bakers' Mut. Co-op. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1941), affirming
40 B.T.A. 656 (1939); Dayton & M.R.R. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1940),
affirming 40 B.T.A. 857 (1939); William Cluff Co., 7 B.T.A. 662 (1927).
36. Green Bay & W.R.R. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1945), affirming 3
T.C. 372 (1944); Hoguet Real Estate Corp., 30 T.C. 580, 598 (1958); Greensboro News
Co., 31 B.T.A. 812 (1934).
37. See Bowersock Mills & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1949);
Bemis Hardwood Lumber Co. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 851 (W.D.N.C. 1954);
Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37, 58 (1956).
38. Gregg Co. v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 946
(1957), affirming 23 T.C. 170 (1954); Wetterau Grocer Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 158
(8th Cir. 1950); Bakers' Mut. Co-op. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1941),
affirming 40 B.T.A. 656 (1939).
39. Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1962),
reversing 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1131 (1960); Diamond Calk Horse Shoe Co. v. United
States, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1168 (D. Minn.), aff'd mem. 116 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1940);
Elliott-Lewis Co., 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 47 (1945), aff'd per curiam, 154 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1946).
40. Dayton & M.R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 857 (1939), aff'd, 112 F.2d 627
(4th Cir. 1940); William Cluff Co., 7 B.T.A. 662 (1927). Note that the Supreme Court
in John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946), apparently felt that the
contingency of interest payments was not fatal to the taxpayer's case.
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who has allowed the claims of others to supersede his may not recover his
funds upon the liquidation of assets. If the shareholder was willing to allow
himself to be put in this unenviable position, some courts have felt that this
indicated stock rather than debt.4 1 Similarly, equal rank among creditors is
indicative of a debt relationship.42 Other cases, however, contend that subordi-
nation is not fatal to the taxpayer's cause."13 From the point of view of
modern business practice, it is common for investors to allow their rights to
be subordinated in return for higher interest rates or other benefits, when
the possibility of default appears to be minimal."4
F. Voting Rights
Generally, instruments containing voting rights are said to resemble stock.4
However, where the voting rights do not represent ownership rights, as in
the case where such rights are given as additional security for the loan
in case of default, a debtor-creditor relationship can still be maintained.4
G. Right To Share in Profits
Since the right to share in the profits of the corporation is generally regarded
as one of the most important rights given to stockholders, there is little
room for disagreement that the presence of such a provision will be fatal to
the taxpayer 47
41. Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, 31S F.2d 3S (5th Cir. 1963), affirming 31 P-H Tax
CL Mlem. 10 (1962); Brown-Rogers-Dixson Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 347 (4th Cir.
1941), affirming 9 P-H Tax Ct. Mlem. 793 (1940); Dayton & A,.R.R. v. CommisiJoner, supra
note 40; Elko Lamoille Power Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1931), affirming
21 B.T.A. 291 (1930).
42. Helvering v. Richmond, F. & P.R.R., 90 F.2d 971 (4th Cir. 1937), affirming 33 B.T.A.
S95 (1936); Bemis Hardwood Lumber Co. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. S51 (W.DXN.C.
1954). However, it has been said that this may carry little weight. The Colony, Inc., 26
T.C. 30 (1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 28
(1958).
43. Bowersock Mlills & Power Co. v. Commissioner 172 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1949); Com-
missioner v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1935); Elliott-Lewis Co, 14 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 139 (1945), aff'd per curiam, 154 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1946); Bollinger-Franklin
Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 402 (1927).
44. See Graham, Dodd & Cottle, Security Analysis 377 (4th ed. 1962); Guthmann &
Dougall, Corporate Financial Policy 207 (4th ed. 1962); Johnson, Financial Managcment 441
(2d ed. 1962).
45. See Crown Iron Works Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.2d 357 (Sth Cir. 1957), affirming
25 P-H Tax Ct. Mlem. 834 (1956); May Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Commi sioner, 123 F.2d
858 (4th Cir. 1941), affirming 42 B.T.A. 646 (1940); Sunny Isles Ocean Beach Co. v. Coyle,
9 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 388 (W.D.N.Y. 1961); Ernst Kern Co., I T.C. 249 (1942). But even
as to this factor, there is not total agreement. Helvering v. Richmond, F. & P.R.R., 90 F.2d
971 (4th Cir. 1937), affirming 33 B.T.A. 895 (1936); Hemenway-Johnson Furniture Co.,
17 P-H Tax Ct. Mlem. 322 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 174 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1949).
46. Luden's Inc. v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Estate of Ernest
G. Howes, 30 T.C. 909, 924 (1958).
47. See Bonds, Inc, 13 P-H Tax CL Mem. 1294 (1944); Hale-Justis Drug Co., 12 P-H
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II. THIN CAPITALIZATION
The sole opinion of the Supreme Court in the area of stockholder advances
was handed down in connection with the cases of John Kelley Co. v. Com-
missioner and Talbot Mills v. Commissioner.48 The court saw fit to combine
the two cases since the facts and issues were quite similar.
The Tax Court, in Kelley, held that the payments made to the debenture
holders were interest and therefore deductible,49 but the court of appeals
reversed this decision.50 In Talbot Mills, the Tax Court held that the registered
notes were equivalent to stock and payments on them were not deductible.8 1
The court of appeals affirmed.52 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari °"
and upheld the decision of the Tax Court in both cases.54
The question in both cases was largely procedural. Namely, was the Tax
Court's determination subject to review by a higher court? The Supreme Court
relied on the so-called Dobson Rule5r in holding that the decisions of the Tax
Court are final on all issues except clear-cut questions of law. The Court then
stated that whether a payment to shareholders constituted interest or dividend
is not such a question.
The holding in this case was overshadowed by its dictum. Mr. Justice Reed's
statement, that "as material amounts of capital were invested in stock, we
need not consider the effect of extreme situations such as nominal stock in-
vestments and an obviously excessive debt structure,""0 was quickly seized
Tax Ct. Mem. 677 (1943); Bakers' Mut. Co-op. Ass'n, 40 B.T.A. 656 (1939), aff'd, 117
F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1941). Contra, Helvering v. Richmond, F. & P.R.R., 90 F.2d 971, 975
(4th Cir. 1937), affirming 33 B.TA. 895, 899 (1936).
48. 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
49. 1 T.C. 457 (1943). The taxpayer, a family owned corporation, issued $150,000 in
income debenture bearer bonds, which provided for interest of 8% noncumulative. The
debentures were payable in 20 years on December 31, 1956 and contained a provision
conditioning interest payments upon the sufficiency of net income. The bonds were offered
only to shareholders but were assignable. They contained no voting rights and were
subordinated to the claims of all other creditors.
50. 146 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1944).
51. 3 T.C. 95 (1944). The taxpayer was a family owned corporation with capital stock
valued at $50,000. In a recapitalization move in 1939, each shareholder was asked to
surrender four-fifths of his stock in lieu of registered notes having a total face value of
$400,000. The notes were to be payable in 25 years on December 1, 1964 and carried an
interest provision which provided for an annual interest rate which was not to exceed 10%,
nor fall below 2%. However, the interest was cumulative but could be postponed until the
notes' maturity if the financial position of the corporation required it. The agreement
forbade the subordination of the notes to any other obligation maturing earlier than the
maturity date of the notes. Likewise, the corporation was limited in its rights to mort-
gage its real assets.
52. 146 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1944).
53. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 843 (1945); Talbot Mills v. CommIssioner,
325 U.S. 844 (1945).
54. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
55. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). This rule has since been discarded.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7482(a).
56. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. at 526.
upon by the courts and used to justify various thin capitalization tests. Thus,
the era when thin capitalization became an oft-used test for determining
whether a particular payment was interest or a dividend had arrived.c?
It should be noted, however, that Kelley did not render previous tests ob-
solete. Rather, they were complemented by the thin capitalization factor.
As the Supreme Court pointed out, "there is no one characteristic ... which
can be said to be decisive in the determination of whether the obligations
are risk investments in the corporations or debts."03
The courts have varied greatly in the weight they have given to inadequate
capitalization. During the thin capitalization era, corporations often found
that even though they issued straightforward debt securities (i.e., non-hybrid),
the Tax Court would strike them down because of inadequate capitalization.P
Nevertheless, the courts in their search for some objective standards, could find
little agreement as to what was a proper debt-equity ratio. The reason for
this, no doubt, is that few courts had a clear notion of what norm should
be used in measuring a company's capital structure. Zeal to seize upon an
objective standard led some courts to interpret Kelly as approving 4:1 as a
"safe" ratio.60
Illustrating the confusion in this area, there have been cases in which the
courts have imposed a stockholder relationship where the debt-equity ratio
has been comparatively low.61 Weighing strongly in other cases, aside from
their disproportionate debt structures, was the fact that each of the cor-
porations had been nominally capitalized.6 2 In other cases, where equity in-
vestments were more substantial, however, the courts nonetheless refused to find
the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship.03
On the other hand, there have been cases in which the debt-equity ratios
have been as high as 50:1,04 but despite this Tax Court decisions have found the
advances to be debt.65 As a result of these and other opinions, tax counsel were
57. Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17th Inst. on Fed. Tax
771, 779 (1959).
58. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. at 530. Accord, Crawford Drug
Stores, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1955); Bemis Hardwood Lumber
Co. v. United States, 117 F. Supp. 351 (W.D.N.C. 1954); Bakers' Mut. Co-op. .n v.
Commissioner, 117 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1941), affirming 40 B.T.A. 656 (1939).
59. For an extensive listing of "thin capitalization" cases involving straight-forward
instruments which were held not to represent debt, see Caplin, supra note 57, at 7,30-1.
60. Although the Supreme Court did not mention it direcly, the debt-equity ratio in
Talbot Ms after recapitalization was 4:1. 326 US. at 524. See Caplin, supra note 57,
at 783-84; Weis, The Labyrinth of the Thin Corporation, 40 Taxes 563, 573-74 (1962).
61. J. Terry Huffstutler, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Blem. 1422 (1953) (5:1); Wallace L. Che-zhire,
11 CCH Tax Ct. lem. 146 (1952) (5:1); Sam Schnitzer, 13 T.C. 43 (1949) (4:1).
62. Ryan Contracting Corp., 15 CCH Tax CL Meem. 999 (1956) (230:1); Joseph Verner
Reed, 14 CCH Tax Ct. MAem. 455 (1955) (435:1); Swoby Corp., 9 T.C. 8S7 (1947) (1250:1).
63. E.g., John F. Douglas, 17 CCH Tax Ct. MAem. 143 (1958) (50:1); Charles A.
Polizzi, 16 CCH Tax CL MAem. 66S (1957) (69:1); Mullin Bldg. Corp., 9 T.C. 350 (1947),
aff'd mem. 167 F.2d 1c01 (3d Cir. 1948) (29:1).
64. J. I. Morgan, Inc., 30 T.C. SS (1958), rev'd on other grounds, 272 F.2d 936 (9th
Cir. 1959).
65. E.g., Sun Properties Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955) (310:1);
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hard-pressed when advising their clients as to capital structures which would
satisfy the Commissioner and the courts.
III. FIFTH CIRCUIT REJECTS THIN CAPITALIZATION
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has refused to accept the debt-
equity test. Rather, it has relied primarily on the intention of the parties,
as did the courts prior to Kelley.66 Its position was first made clear in Rowan
v. United States.6 7 There, the shareholders had contributed 9,000 dollars
toward capital, and over a period of several years had made advances on open
account, totalling 125,000 dollars. After showing losses for a number of years,
the corporation was liquidated by the Rowans and the other two share-
holders of the company. The question before the court was whether a 50,944
dollar loss suffered by the taxpayers upon liquidation was a loss on debt or
equity funds. In allowing the bad debt deduction, the court stated that "it
would obviously work an unwarranted interference by the courts .. .for us
to say that there can be established, as a matter of hindsight, a ratio of
stockholder owned debt to the capital of the debtor corporation."08
In Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States,69 the Fifth Circuit in allowing a
tax refund reaffirmed its position on the thin capitalization test. The record
showed that the sole shareholder of the corporation had contributed only 400
dollars to capital and had "sold" to it, on credit, a warehouse valued at
125,000 dollars. The Commissioner contended that since only a nominal
amount of capital was invested in the firm, the transfer of the warehouse was
not a sale but rather a contribution to capital. The circuit court, however,
felt that there was a valid sale and debt. Although the corporation had a
ratio of approximately 310:1, the court stated that "we do not think this
is any ground to infer that this transaction was a contribution to capital." 70
IV. TRUE INTENTION
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commis-
sioner,71 has been hailed as a milestone in the debt-equity controversy. 72
Here the Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's contention that the bonds in
question actually represented stock interest. The case seems to stand for
the proposition that a court, presented with the question of an advance being
debt or equity, has to try to determine the true intent of the parties. This
is similar to the pre-Kelley decisions. However, it differs in that the court did
not confine itself to the "four corners of the instrument" but rather con-
Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955) (14:1); Arthur v. McDermott, 13
T.C. 468 (1949) (19:1).
66. See Weis, supra note 60, at 578-81.
67. 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955).
68. Id. at 55.
69. 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
70. Id. at 175.
71. 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957), affirming 23 T.C.
408 (1954).
72. See Caplin, supra note 57, at 784-88; Rabin, supra note 34, at 282-85; Weis, supra
note 60, at 580-83.
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sidered all surrounding circumstances.7 3 The significant fact in Gooding Amuse-
ment was that the instruments were straightforward 71 and, in the words of
the Tax Court, "the formal criteria of indebtedness are unquestionably satis-
fied."75
The court considered the identity between the shareowners and the bond-
holders as being significant regarding the question of a possible default
on interest or principal payments by the corporation, 0 and felt that it would
be unreasonable to assume that the bondholders would enforce the notes upon
default because of this identity. This, along with the court's feeling that Mrs.
Gooding and her infant daughter would do nothing as shareholders that
would be inconsistent with Mr. Goodings desires, was decisive. In effect, the
Goodings' view of the transaction was appraised as being similar to that
of any equity owner, i.e., that they would do nothing that would endanger
the financial position of the firm.
Another element mentioned was that the notes were subordinated to other
creditors 7 Also deemed significant was the fact that no demand for payment
was made after the majority of the notes had reached maturity.'8 In reply
to the taxpayer's argument that it had justifiable business purposes in issuing
the notes, the court felt that "its status as a motive ... was minor."m In the
end, the court concluded that "the only substantial purpose motivating the
transaction was one of tax avoidance,"8 0 and therefore it should not be al-
lowed for tax purposes.
73. One observer notes that "with the advent of Gooding Amusement Company we see
the 4:1 'safe' ratio myth shattered at last with the courts now looking towards all the
surrounding facts and circumstances." Weis, supra note 60, at 5M0. (Emphasis omitted.)
Another remarked, in connection with Gooding Amusement and similar cases, that "some-
thing more than mere compliance with technical or clerical formalities to determine whether
a true debtor-creditor status was intended." CommentI The Thin Incorporation Problem:
Are the Courts Fighting the Tar Baby?, 5 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 275, 286 (1958). (Emphasis
omitted.)
74. The taxpayer, a closely held corporation (three stockholders: Mr. and Mrs. Gooding
and their infant daughter), was formed after a family partnership dissolved itself and
transferred its assets to the corporation. In exchange for the re-evaluated assets of the
partnership, totalling $281,000, the corporate taxpayer issued $49,000 worth of no-par
common stock and $232,000 in short-term interest bearing notes to the Goodings in pro-
portion to their interests in the dissolved partnership. Due to the goodvill transferred from
the partnership, the debt-equity ratio was estimated at about 1:1, but this fact carried
little weight with the court. The Tax Court noted that "the 'thin capitalization' factor is only
one of the indica from which the presence or absence of a debtor-creditor relationship
may be determined. We do not consider it decisive of the present isue." Gooding Amuse-
ment Co., 23 T.C. at 419.
75. Id. at 413.
76. Id. at 418-19.
77. Id. at 419. Although the finding of facts by the Tax Court sbowed that the notes
were subordinated, Judge McAllister, dissenting on appeal, claimed that there was never
any legal subordination but merely a forebearance in making a claim for the principal due.
Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d at 167 (dissenting opinion).
78. 23 T.C. at 419.
79. Id. at 420.
SO. Id. at 420-21.
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On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 8' reiterated with favor the Tax Court's
reasoning and noted, as did the Tax Court, that transactions, although valid
on their faces, which depend on sham or lack genuineness will not be sus-
tained for tax purposes. The old notion that substance prevails over form was
echoed by the court.
On the basis of Gooding Amusement, a taxpayer could no longer be safe
by simply casting its "debt" transactions with shareholders in an unambiguous
form. Furthermore, it was likely to find little protection from the Commils-
sioner's attacks by showing a low debt-equity ratio. Rather, it apparently had
to act like a creditor, lest the transaction be susceptible of being labeled a
"sham."
V. BusINEss PURPosE
Another criterion used periodically by the Tax Court has been the "business
purpose" test. The importance of this factor was first suggested in Gregory v.
Helvering.82 Though the decision dealt with reorganization, its reasoning has
been carried over into the area of stockholder advances.83 As a result, taxpayer
transactions became susceptible to attack by the Commissioner on the grounds
that they were a sham and their sole purpose was tax avoidance.84 Some cases
have scrutinized the taxpayer's initial purpose for incorporating, 5 while
others have challenged the motives behind the issuance of certain debt in-
struments.8 6 The result is that the term "business purpose" evades definition.
81. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
82. 293 U.S. 465 (1935). The case involved a reorganization under the Revenue Act of
1928, ch. 852, § 112, 45 Stat. 816. A corporation wholly owned by the taxpayer transferred
to a fully owned corporation part of its assets, i.e., 1000 shares of stock in another cor-
poration. The new corporation in return issued all its shares to the taxpayer and shortly
thereafter was dissolved. Upon liquidation of the new corporation, the 1000 shares were
distributed to the taxpayer who sold them for her private gain. As a result, her tax
liability on the gain was less than it would have been had the shares been directly paid
to her in the form of an ordinary dividend. The Supreme Court decided that although
the transaction conformed with the provisions of the statute, it was nothing more than a
masquerade for the purpose of tax avoidance. Id. at 470. However, the Court pointed out
that it was permissible for a taxpayer to reduce his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by any
means which the law permits. This last criterion was not met by the taxpayer, for although
the reorganization statute allowed tax reduction, the intention of the statute was such
as to require non-tax business motives to be also evident. For a discussion of the Gregory
case and other cases dealing with reorganization, see McCaffery, "Business Purpose" or
"Business Continuation"?, 30 Taxes 187 (1952).
83. Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956); Broadway Drive-in Theatre,
Inc. v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Mo. 1963); Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582
(1959); Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956).
84. Miller v. Commissioner, supra note 83, at 734; Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra note 83,
at 60.
85. E.g., Miller v. Commissioner, supra note 83, at 734; Emanuel N. Kolkey, supra
note 83, at 60; Comment, The Thin Incorporation Problem: Are the Courts Fighting the
Tar Baby?, supra note 73, at 283.
86. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159, 166 (6th Cir. 1956); Warren
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Does it refer to the corporation's purpose, or the shareholder's purpose? The
latter, in closely held corporations, is frequently difficult to separate from the
corporation's motives and objectives. Moreover, does it refer to motives at
the time of incorporation, or simply to the purpose in issuing certain in-
struments? Furthermore, what type of business purpose is required; will any
business motive suffice? S7 The problem here is that, although the term carries
with it a ring of definiteness, no one has been able to reduce it to objective
and ascertainable norms.
VI. SUBsTANTIL EcoNoMC REXALITY
In 1962, the Second Circuit, in Nassau Lens Co. V. Commissioner,83 took
a significant step forward in reducing the confusion in the area of debt-equity.
The importance of this decision rests in the fact that the court took cognizance
of economic realities found in the business world. In allowing the taspayer's
interest deduction, the court appears to have taken a "reasonable man" a
approach to the problem, as well as having strongly denounced the usefulness
of the traditional business purpose test.
The Nassau Lens case involved the transfer of all the assets of an optical
supply business to the taxpayer corporation. The owner of the supply business
received all the stock of the new corporation, together with debenture notes
having the value of 100,000 dollars. As a result of the transfer of assets, the
corporation began operations with a total capitalization of approximately
195,000 dollars. In lieu of periodic interest, the notes provided that the
corporation would pay the holder 150,000 dollars upon maturity. The tax-
payer claimed that 50,000 dollars of this should be discounted and on its
1954 income tax return it deducted 4,904.10 dollars as the amortized dis-
count s" for the period of January 7, 1954 to December 31, 1954. The Com-
missioner disallowed this deduction and his decision was sustained by the Tax
Court on the ground that the debenture notes, in reality, represented an
equity interest in the corporation.
The Tax Court felt that the distribution of the stock and debentures was
arbitrary and that "no business reasons appear for the artifical division and
allocation of the assets in question. '*' On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed
and remanded the case to the Tax Court for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion. Judge Thurgood Marshall, having disposed of the Com-
H. Brown, 27 T.C. 27, 35 (1956); see Comment, The Thin Incorporation Problem: Are the
Courts Fighting the Tar Baby?, supra note 73, at 275.
87. For a listing of those business purposes which have been sufficient to indicate a
debtor-creditor relationship and those which have not, see 2 P-H 1964 Fed. Tax Serv.
U 13096, at 13066-63.
88. 303 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962).
S9. lickman, Incorporation and Capitalization, The Threat of the 'Potential Income"
Item and a Sensible Approach to Problems of Thinnerss, 40 Taxes 974, 933 (1962).
90. Amortization here means the periodic charging to expense of part of the total
interest due.
91. Nassau Lens Co., 35 T.C. 263, 272 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
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missioner's arguments regarding the valuation of the transferred assets, went
on to criticize the traditional "business purpose" test:92
[W]hile the existence of a tax motive or the lack of a business purpose is the
starting point for a challenge to the form of a transaction adopted by a tnxpayer,
it is, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, not the finish line ...
And since legislative intent must oftentimes be unclear, the form adopted will
usually be recognized except where it is a patent distortion oj normal business
practice .... 93
The court here shifted emphasis from a subjective "business purpose" test
and emphasized that an investment must have "substantial economic reality
in terms of the objective factors which normally surround [it] .,94
The court concluded that "non-arm's-length loans by a stockholder to a
corporation are to be recognized or disregarded for tax purposes according to
the extent to which they comply with arm's-length standards, not the extent
to which the taxpayer has a business purpose." 95 What the court seems to
be saying is that if the taxpayer conforms to accepted business practices,
transactions with its stockholders will be adjudged valid debt, though they
are motivated by tax avoidance. 96
VII. SUBSTANTIAL EcoNoMIc REALITY AND TAX AvOIDANCE
At first blush, the term "substantial economic reality" may appear to be
just another nice phrase having no useful meaning. However, this is not the
case. Judge Marshall, in Nassau Lens, has in fact suggested a reasonable
man test for the solution of the debt-equity problem." Although an in-
strument on its face may represent debt, this will be disregarded if the trans-
action appears not to be economically reasonable. The test of reasonableness,
however, is not based on what would be reasonable to the ordinary citizen,
as it is in areas such as contracts or torts, but rather, the reasonable man
here is the ordinarily prudent businessman.98
When applying this test to determine the motive of the taxpayer, care
should be taken to make a distinction which the courts often fail to recognize.
There is a marked difference between casting one's transactions in such a
way as to achieve legitimate tax avoidance and attempting to obtain tax bene-
92. 308 F.2d at 44-46.
93. Id. at 45. (Emphasis added.)
94. Id. at 46. (Emphasis added.) See Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.
1957). Although there is some difficulty with the interpretation of this case, there appears
to be agreement that the decision, like Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118
(2d Cir. 1956), before it, was a weak but actual rejection of the business purpose test. See
generally Caplin, supra note 57, at 801; Hickman, supra note 89, at 985.
95. 308 F.2d at 46. (Emphasis added.)
96. Id. at 44-45. See Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956),
where the court said, in effect, that clear and unambiguous instruments are evidence of the
intent of the parties and that tax avoidance alone will not defeat the taxpayer's case when
"the acts were real" and not "sham entities." Id. at 128.
97. See 308 F.2d at 45-46.
98. See ibid; Hickman, supra note 89, at 988.
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fits in a way inconsistent with the underlying intent of the Internal Revenue
Code.
One commentator on the Nassau Lens case strongly suggests that even if
the "business purpose" test is not presumed to be defunct today, stockholder
debt, with its consequent tax benefits, can still meet this test under the proper
circumstances.9 9 That is, the incurring of debt, in itself, may be a justifiable
business purpose. This stems from what is called "leverage" or "trading on
the equity."'10 0 However, it appears that stockholder-held indebtedness can
be justified within the "substantial economic reality" rule emphasized in
Nassau Lens, without resort to the traditional "business purpose" test. For
many years, it has been accepted practice within the business community
to include in a corporation's capital structure a certain percentage of debt
funds. The acquisition of funds often is not the primary purpose. Rather,
corporate managers are looking for benefits accruing from the use of
"leverage." "Trading on the equity" is sound practice even though the
funds provided could just as easily have been acquired through equity finan-
cing. Leverage is simply the use of borrowed funds with the hope of gaining
a return that is higher than the interest charged for these funds.10 ' Assuming
favorable earnings, its use can materially increase a stockholder's dividends,
as well as provide a tax benefit to the corporation.'0 2 However, it should be
noted that a sales decline is likewise magnified to the detriment of the share-
holder. 0 3 Generally, it is therefore incumbent on a company "that permanent
99. Hickman, supra note S9, at 985.
100. For a description of the "leverage" process, see Graham, Dodd & Cottle, Security
Analysis Principles and Technique, 636-48 (4th ed. 1962); Guthmann & Dougall, Corporate
Financial Policy, 167-70 (4th ed. 1962); Hickman, supra note S9, at 9S5-S6.
101. Guthmann & Dougall, op. cit. supra note 100, at 167.
102. Two factors are involved. First, since the interest owed to the bondholders is a
fixed sum, any income realized on the borrowed funds over this sum will accrue to the
shareholders. Second, since interest is deductible, a higher proportion of bonds rezults in a
greater reduction of the taxable income of the corporation.
103. For example, consider the effects of leverage upon the rates of return in the follow-
fag table: T o ILLjsTrvL Fxcuns
Year
1st 2nd 3rd 4th sth
1. Earnings before interest $1S0,000 z260,000 $340,C00 $C0,(00 $10,000 (d)
2. Interest on bonds, 6c 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 6M00
3. Income before income taxes 120,000 200,000 2S0,000 0 70,000 (d)
4. Income taxes (50%) 60,000 100,000 140,000 0 0
5. Bal. for stockholders 60,000 100,000 140,000 0 70,000 (d)
6. Total earnings, after taxes 120,000 160,000 200,000 60,000 10,000 (d)
7. Per cent earned on total
investment (after taxes) 6 3 10 3 .05 (d)
S. Per cent earned on stock-
holders' investment 6 10 14 0 7 (d)
(d) = deficit
Guthmann & Dougall, op. cit. supra note 100, at 167, Table 10-1. Notice that fluctuations
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borrowing should be undertaken only when a reasonable stability of income
makes the required payments to the bondholders fairly certain."104
As was mentioned previously, the use of debt financing with its leverage
and tax benefits is an important part of modern corporate life. In this con-
nection, it has been pointed out that "since the federal income tax does oper-
ate to encourage outsider indebtedness and contributes substantially to its
profitability, the corporation which does not or cannot borrow outside, would
be placed at a serious competitive disadvantage were the courts to hold
that stockholder debt is not eligible for the same treatment as outsider
debt." 1'
Once it is agreed that this type of corporate indebtedness is justifiable on
the basis of economic reality, the next question is, how does one determine
what is economically reasonable in a given situation? Here, it seems, the
often-used and abused debt-equity test has some application. Although this
test has allegedly been the basis of numerous decisions, the courts appear to
be far from clear as to its nature and application. Obviously, the basic pur-
pose of the ratio is to indicate the extent to which the corporation is making
use of leverage. However, to be meaningful, it must be used in conjunction
with data reflecting the variability of the company's earnings.
During the "heyday" of the debt-equity test, some suggested that a ratio
of 4:1 was "safe."10 It must be realized, however, that a certain ratio may
mean favorable leverage and tax savings to one corporation where the same
ratio, used by another, could mean certain financial disaster. Thus, any debt-
equity ratio must be compared with earnings fluctuation, which in turn is
a function of the consumer demand, product sold, the competition within
the industry, costs and other factors.107
Again, in trying to determine whether a certain amount of debt is excessive
for a particular company, i.e., whether it is in conformity with economic
in the rate of stockholder earnings (line 8) are magnified by the use of leverage. The
table assumes that both the stockholders and bondholders each invested $1,000,000. Thus,
the use of leverage becomes economically unreasonable when a moderate decline In
revenue would cause the corporation to default on its bond interest payments or cause
it to use its surplus in order to remain solvent. Column "5" shows such a result. This
indicates that this company's 1:1 debt-equity ratio is too high. For another company
whose sales are more stable, such a ratio may be too low.
104. Guthmann & Dougall, op. cit. supra note 100, at 169-70. Theoretically, If a
company sold a product whose demand never fluctuated and earnings were the same
every year, and this company was the only one selling the item, it could then "trade
on its equity" to the extent of having almost its entire capital structurpe comprised of
debt funds. Such situations are practically nonexistent and, therefore, a firm must Issue
debt only up to that amount which it can safely accommodate under adverse conditions.
105. Hickman, supra note 89, at 986. It is interesting to note that a suggested solution,
where the outside loan has been guaranteed by a shareholder of the corporate borrower,
is to apply the same treatment afforded to a direct loan by that shareholder to the cor-
poration. Holzman, The Current Trend in Guarantee Cases: An Impetus to Thin-Incorpora-
tion?, 11 Tax L. Rev. 29, 47-48 (1955).
106. Caplin supra note 57, at 783-84; Weis, supra note 60, at 573-74.
107. See Davis, Marketing Management 209-34 (1961).
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reality, the first concern should be the protection afforded the debtholders.
That is, are earnings substantial enough so that, even with a decrease in in-
come, debt accommodation will be assured. A text on security analysis shows
that in a comparison of thirty major industries in the United States, the
percentage of senior securities (preferred stock and debt) in the companies
comprising these industries was never greater than 35 per cent.103 Even if we
were to assume that the senior securities section was comprised of debt alone,
a capital structure of 65 per cent common stock and 35 per cent debt would
give a debt-equity ratio of only about 0.5:1.
108. Coiam.,sow or LEVETxG mm PricE-E. arcs PTIos or 30 M,%joa IDmurnms:
1955-1959 Avm%oEs
(Industries ranked by price-earnings ratios)
Common Senior
stoch as ecurtite as
%of total 5 of total
Industries capital capital
Electrical supplies and equipment 76 24
Chemicals 69 31
Ethical Drugs 87 13
Proprietary Drugs 35 is
Paper and allied products 77 23
Toilet preparations and soap 81 19
Meat packing 69 31
Apparel and accessories chain stores 90 10
Automobiles 86 14
Radio and television 72 28
Glass and metal container 66 34
Nonferrous Metals inl. copper 91 9
Mail-order 90 10
Rubber 69 31
Corn products 84 16
Building materials 39 11
Oil industry 85 is
General industrial machinery 33 17
Dairy products 79 21
Grain-mill products 70 30
Limited-price variety stores 84 16
Grocery chain stores 72 23
Steel so 20
Distilling 72 28
Department stores 65 35
Aircraft S4 16
Automobile parts and accessories 92 8
Agricultural machinery 76 24
Cigarette 65 35
Textile fabrics 67 33
Graham, Dodd & Cotte, op. cit. supra note 100, at 546, Table 40-6. The right-hand
column of the table has not been included since it is not pertinent here.
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The same text also offers what it considers the ideal capital structure for
public utilities. 1' 9 Even with public utilities, whose earnings are relatively
stable because of consistency of demand, government regulation and lack
of competition, the suggested capital structure yields a debt-equity ratio of
little more than 1.5:1. The relatively low ratios indicate what business men
and authors consider to be prudent levels of capitalization. Based on past
experience, they reflect the amount of debt which can be safely accomodated,
even under adverse conditions, without jeopardizing the solvency of the firms.
These and like figures indicate what is reasonable and prudent business
practice. In effect, they represent what Nassau Lens referred to as "substan-
tial economic reality."
Applying these standards to a 1956 proposal of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, °0 which advocated statutory immunity to indebtedness up to a
ratio of 10:1, it would seem that the proposal is far too permissive and fails
to take account of economic realities. It would allow, without challenge, fifteen
to twenty times as much debt in a corporation's capital structure as is now
generally accepted as prudent by the business world."'
VIII. THE SUGGESTED APPROACH
One author, after proceeding in an analysis similar to the one in the pre-
vious section, concluded correctly that the debt-equity ratio as derived from
the balance sheet is in itself an inadequate tool in stockholder "loan" con-
troversies since it does not take into account income variation.112 He there-
fore concludes that "the most useful approach to a meaningful debt standard
lies in an analysis of patterns of variation of income and expense in a given
situation or in comparable groups . . . ,,11 Although this approach would be
a significant improvement, it still fails to produce any standard which would
bring order and consistency to the stock-debt problem.
The solution to the problem lies in regulatory action. Following is a plan
which could be used with facility, speed and fairness by the Internal Revenue
Service in deciding debt-equity questions. Basically, the plan involves the con-
struction of schedules by the Treasury Department which would reflect rea-
sonable and prudent stock-debt proportions of the various industries" 4 as
109. Graham, Dodd & Cottle, op. cit. supra note 100, at 277, suggest the following
capital structure as being ideal for public utilities:
Bonds 50%
Preferred Stock 1s
Common Stock 35
and surplus
TOTAL 100%
110. 81 A.B.A. Rep. 155, 160-61 (1956).
111. See notes 108 & 109 supra and accompanying text.
112. Hickman, supra note 89, at 990.
113. Id at 991.
114. See note 108 supra. For ease of handling, it would seem that the relationship
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determined by the experience of men in the field. With the facilities and in-
formation available to the Treasury Department, this type of table could
be constructed essentially on a modified form of the debt-equity ratio.
In answer to the obvious objection that the debt-equity ratio does not
take into consideration the crucial factor of earnings fluctuation, it is ap-
parent upon closer scrutiny that this factor would already be implicitly
recog-nized in the construction of the guidelines. TMore precisely, since the
percentages used would be derived from actual business practice within a
particular industry, they would represent a consensus as to the amount of
debt that can be safely accomnodated in light of demand variation, com-
petition, product changes and other elements which have a direct bearing on
income fluctuation.
Obviously, the proposed schedules, since they would be based on mean
figures, would have to contain some provision for variations from the norm
in any particular case. Here, a statistical standard deviation process could be
used.115 Thus, any company whose debt content fell within the range pre-
scribed would be unchallenged, provided that there was no other indication
that a genuine debtor-creditor relationship was not intended.
In the case of a capital structure whose debt content exceeded the regula-
tory debt limit, the taxpayer should be given the opportunity to present
evidence showing conclusively that its particular capital structure was within
the bounds of substantial economic reality. Thus, the burden of proof would
be on the taxpayer to show that unusual extcrnal business conditions justify
what would normally be an excessive debt structure. For example, a corpora-
tion may be able to show that in the geographical area in which it operates
the demand for its type of product is significantly more stable in comparison
to the overall industry demand. Such a factor could favorably affect income
stability, thus making it economically feasible to carry a greater proportion
of debt. Here again, it is important to note that any company attempting to
show that it should not be judged by the regulatory standard must show that
within its area of operations, objective conditions materially vary with those
experienced by the majority of the others in the industry. Were the statute
to allow certain corporations to be afforded special treatment because of
unusual internal conditions, or where external conditions varied only slightly
from the ordinary, the very purpose of the guidelines, i.e., to provide the
Commissioner with readily applicable objective standards, would be defeated.
Finally, one other suggestion should be considered. Historically, in debt-
equity cases, the courts have either found all of the loan to be equity or all
of it to represent stockownership.1n  Rarely have the cases allowed part of
between stock and debt is better expressed as a percentage rather than as a ratio. The
permissible debt-equity percentages could be established as guidelines in a manner similar
to depredation guidelines. 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 419-23.
115. For an eplanation of the standard deviation procests, see Neter & Wascerman,
Fundamental Statistics for Business and Economics 249-50, 253-63 (2d ed. 1961).
116. E.g., Kraft Foods Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1956); Sun Properties,
Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955); Wallace L. Chesshire, 11 CCII Tax Ct.
Mem. 146 (1952); Swoby Corp., 9 T.C. 8S7 (1947).
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the advanced funds to be considered debt and the remainder stock.117 As a
result, the taxpayer came out of court either a total winner or a total loser.
The proposed guidelines should, therefore, contain provisions whereby a tax-
payer whose capital structure is excessive would be allowed to treat at least
part of its borrowed funds as debt for tax purposes. Anything over that
which the Treasury guidelines considered a reasonable amount of debt would
then be regarded as equity. Such an approach seems infinitely more fair than
the present all-or-nothing method." 8
In applying the approach to a particular case, the Internal Revenue Service
would initially compare the taxpayer's capital structure to the appropriate
regulatory norm. Upon ascertaining that a corporation had not exceeded the
limits set forth by the guidelines, the taxpayer would then be allowed to
deduct all interest payments. This presumes, however, that there were no
other factors present which would tend to indicate to the Commissioner that
a true debtor-creditor relationship was not intended." °
If the taxpayer's debt structure proved to be excessive, he would then
be given the opportunity to show that external factors within its area of opera-
tions were so materially different from those faced by the rest of the industry
that the industry's norm should not be applied to it. It would then be the
Commissioner's task to see if the level of debt was economically reasonable
in light of these unique factors.
117. There have been a few cases in which stockholder advances have been allocated
between debt and equity for tax purposes but the majority of these have dealt with
situations in which the advances were made at various times and thus easily segregated.
Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1941) (bankruptcy); Bijou-Pensacola Corp. v.
United States, 172 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Fla. 1959) (tax refund); J. Terry Huffstutler, 12
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1422 (1953) (bad debt deductions); George 3. Schaefer, 24 T.C. 638
(1955) (bad debt deductions). See Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 58-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
68316 (N.D. Ala. 1958) (operating losses) where $296,756.70 in advance was apportioned
between debt and equity.
118. "It is unjust to strike down the entire indebtedness of a corporation inadequately
capitalized where a smaller debt would have been recognized if the stockholders were
not so ambitious in establishing a favorable tax structure. If the quantitative method
of determining inadequate capitalization is adopted, it will be a simple procedure to
allow as an indebtedness that portion of the indebtedness in excess of the capital
recognized as essential." Semmel, Tax Consequences of Inadequate Capitalization, 48
Colum. L. Rev. 202, 217-18 (1948).
119. If there is a doubt as to the relationship in resolving the question, primary
attention should be given to the debt instruments involved. Here the traditional tests
(supra pp. 240-45) should be used, with the greatest weight being given to whether
the instrument contained an unconditional promise to repay the entire loan by a fixed
date and some provision for the payment of interest before maturity without regard to
the sufficiency of the debtor's earnings. Any instrument containing these last enumerated
factors should be almost invariably regarded as objective evidence of a debtor-creditor
relationship. Only in situations where other factors strongly indicate an equity relation-
ship, as in the case of the alleged creditor being given the right to participate In the
every day management of the corporation, should these essential elements be given
less weight. As indicated before, it does not appear that subordination in general should
be considered a strong factor indicative of equity. Supra pp. 244-45.
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